

**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

BRIEFLY NOTED

Soviets Decree Death Penalty for More Crimes: Three offenses have just been added to the constantly increasing list of crimes punishable by death in the Soviet Union, according to new decrees published in the official bulletin of the Supreme Soviet and reported by the AP from Moscow on 27 February 1962. The additions include the crimes of bribe-taking, rape, and attacks on policemen. Last spring the death penalty was extended to the crimes of theft of state property (embezzlement), forgery (of money or valuable documents), and terrorism in state prisons and work camps (e. g. 25X1C10b disruption of prison discipline, attacks on the administration). /See

25X1C10b [REDACTED] This increasing resort to capital punishment is a clear indictment by the Soviets themselves of the Communist system in practice. While rape is no respecter of ideological boundaries, bribery flourishes in a bureaucratic society, and attacks on police suggest that the Soviet public does not identify its interests with those of the regime. Communist theoreticians and practitioners have all held that environment (the "organization of production") is the determinant of behavior, that capitalist society in particular causes crime, and that Communist society would eliminate all of the conditions giving rise to crime. But after 45 years Soviet society has not only failed to create the New Soviet Man, but has produced dictators of the proletariat who increasingly resort to harsh penalties (harsher than those of any civilized country in the world) in an attempt to suppress the growing number of crimes in Soviet society.

25X1C10b Peiping Policy Criticized. Attention is called to an article, "Albania, China, Peace," published in New World Review, and reproduced in Press Comment for 2 March 1962. As noted in Press Comment, New World Review is an American Communist-front (i. e. Moscow-influenced) publication, and its circulation of this criticism of Peiping's policy is therefore 25X1C10b of considerable interest. [REDACTED]

Establishment of a Latin American Institute in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In January 1962, the Soviet Academy of Sciences announced the establishment of a Latin American Institute. Headed by former Soviet Minister to Uruguay S. S. Mikhailov, the Institute will perform economic and political research and concentrate on developing specialists in Latin American affairs. Mikhailov stated: "Our Institute has been set up to study problems of the modern economy and politics of Latin American countries. It will also coordinate the research of Soviet experts on Latin America."

In preparation for the major effort made by the Soviets to penetrate the African continent, the Soviet Academy of Sciences had announced the establishment in 1959, of an African Institute. In the same manner, it can be expected that the newly created Latin American Institute will provide basic support for Soviet policy makers and also for the entire Soviet propaganda effort in Latin America.

Soviets Send Cuban Ships Home Empty. On 2 February, the AP reported that Gerardo Arrechea Becquer, the first officer of the Cuban ship Fundador, asked for political asylum in Mexico. Becquer explained that he had made nine trips to the Soviet Union on vessels carrying sugar, food, fruits, hides and other items but in each case his ship returned to Cuba empty. On the other hand he reported that Soviet ships carry arms to Cuba. We wonder whether these practices illustrate the nature of the much vaunted trade agreements between the Cuban Communists and their Soviet masters. Those familiar with international trade know the economic importance to a nation of full productive use of its own ships -- such use often determines the country's ability to meet its foreign currency obligations. The Soviets take all that the Cubans have to offer, send arms in return, and force the Cubans into an unproductive and costly use of their ships. The officer also said that the Fundador carried 80 tons of Communist propaganda printed in Argentina for eventual distribution in Cuba. We note wryly that babies cannot eat pamphlets any more than arms and munitions.

Chinese Flag to Fly over Cuban School. Ceremonies presided over by members of the Chinese Embassy were held in January 1962 to name a school in Havana after the People's Republic of China, according to the Cuban official daily, Revolucion. A flag of China was presented to the school; in return, a Cuban flag was given to the Chinese representatives which will eventually be raised in a Chinese school. We note this fine example of cooperation between the Cuban instructors in guerrilla warfare and the representatives of Mao Tse-tung's theories of armed revolution and wonder whether the children will grow up under the influence of Mao's interpretation of Marx rather than that of Khrushchev.

U.S. Makes Another Constructive Proposal to Eliminate Controversy Over Berlin Access Routes. In an interview with Mr. Adzhubei on 25 November 1961, President Kennedy suggested that an International Access Authority would provide a reasonable solution to the problem of access to Berlin. The Secretary of State reiterated this proposal in a press conference on 2 March 1962. Such an authority, supplementing existing access arrangements between West Germany and Berlin, and based on objective, effective and legally binding rules governing the use of transportation and communications facilities under its control, would eliminate the danger of clashes between the countries directly concerned. The offer in this proposal is further evidence of the fact that the U.S., far from "dragging its feet" on the Berlin problem, is offering fair and constructive solutions to pressing dangers of a collision between Soviet and Western armed forces over blocked access to Berlin. This is the kind of solution which neutral and uncommitted nations should find palatable and to which they should be expected to give their full support. It is also a realistic proposal which Sovbloc personnel, who have initiated disruption and harassment in the access routes for political purposes in recent months, should find difficult to evade. The foot-dragging attributed to the United States is in fact being done by the Soviet Union as far as just solutions are concerned. Further evasion by the Soviet Union should make it evident to the rest of the world that Soviet intent is to run rough-shod over all reasonable proposals and to gain complete control over Berlin by force and the threat of force. Reaction to this proposal should reflect upon the Soviet meaning of "peaceful coexistence" and its attitude toward negotiated settlement of disputes.

493  
25X1C 105 Survival from a Nuclear Attack

**Background:** One of the most important objectives of Soviet policy is to convince the Free World that nuclear war means certain death. This is an essential part of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign simultaneously to frighten and cajole the rest of the world into accepting Soviet demands. Marshal Malinovsky has asserted (24 January 1962) that the USSR is capable of destroying whole countries with U.S. bases on their territories (Khrushchev made several similar statements last year) and the Marshal has ridiculed (as has Ambassador Menshikov) U.S. shelter-building programs on the grounds that shelters against atom and hydrogen bombs are nothing but coffins. The Soviet aim, of course, is to show that ultimately there are only two alternatives: to be Red, or to be dead.


Soviet statements about the uselessness of shelters are belied by Soviet civil defense measures. For example, subway construction in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev includes measures for converting the subways to shelters, such as the provision of blast-proof doors. Most Soviet civil defense activities are under the "Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force, and Navy" (DOSAAF). This organization, with 22,000,000 members, also conducts paramilitary training, and has its own publishing facilities. One booklet for instructors in civil defense was issued in 1961 in 200,000 copies. Another pamphlet, "Be Ready for Anti-Aircraft Defense," is designed for children. The organization also issued recently a 40 page album with pictures, drawings and charts. One picture shows a Soviet family (evidently not an average family) preparing for a nuclear attack by filling the bathtub with water, turning on the radio, blacking out all lights, preparing emergency food supplies, and gathering in the living room. On 7 October, the New York Times published Mme. Khrushchev's statement to the peace marchers that the USSR was making no civil defense preparations. On the same day, the Times also printed illustrations from a Soviet civil defense booklet, showing four different types of shelter (ditch, individual, family, and community). /See Press Comment, 19 October 1961. An article from a DOSAAF publication is reproduced in Press Comment 2 March 1962.7 Evidently the Soviets do not really believe that shelters are useless. They do, however, refrain from publicizing their civil defense effort, partly because they wish to delude the rest of the world, and partly because they fear a panic among the Soviet people.

The best available guide in English to defense against nuclear attack is the United States Defense Department booklet Fallout Protection: What to Know and Do about Nuclear Attack, copies of which are attached to this Bi-Weekly guidance. This booklet, while recognizing that nuclear conflict "would be terrible beyond imagination," adds that "there is much that can be done to assure that it would not mean the end of the life of our nation." The booklet points out that while no program can prevent large-scale loss of life, "an effective program of civil defense could save the lives of millions who would not otherwise survive."

12 March 1962

This last is the most cogent argument for a shelter program. But there is another argument which is politically very important, and which is not mentioned in the booklet: a domestic shelter program is an essential part of an effective deterrent. If the Free World wants the Soviets to believe that it is prepared if necessary to fight a nuclear war -- in other words, if our deterrent is to deter -- it is important to show that we are taking measures to ensure the survival of a part of our population. If we simply armed without building shelters, the Kremlin could logically conclude either that we were bluffing, or that we were preparing to make a surprise first attack. Either conclusion could be disastrous. The best way to prevent any actual nuclear attack is to maintain a position of calm preparedness, avoiding either hysterical threats or a misleading appearance of weakness.

25X1C10b



(493.)



494. AFRICA: Aftermath of the Lagos Conference

25X1C10b

Background: Twenty independent African states, all of them members of the moderate "Monrovia" group, met at a conference in Lagos, Nigeria, January 22-30 for consideration of some common problems. The "Casablanca" group of more hard-line powers (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR) did not attend, ostensibly because representatives of the Provisional Government of Algeria had not been invited. Tunisia, Libya (both members of the "Monrovia" group) and Sudan, all of which countries had been invited, did not participate for the same reason. The Conference began in a dispirited and divisive atmosphere, largely due to differences over whether or not the Provisional Government of Algeria should have been invited. The feeling of frustration and disillusionment among those at Lagos because of the absent "Casablanca" and other powers was greatly reduced as the Conference proceeded, apparently for two principal reasons: first, a realization that, although reconciliation was not immediately possible, the remaining moderate group of independent states could affirm their determination to move ahead while leaving the door open for eventual rapprochement; second, the dramatic arrival on the scene at Lagos of the Congolese Premier Adoula had a galvanizing effect on the Conference. Following his outline of the situation in the Congo, the Conference unanimously authorized dispatch of a message to the UN Security Council requesting it to refrain, in view of the "present welcome and encouraging development," from any action which might jeopardize the good prospects for a solution of the Congo problem. Governor-General Azikiwe of Nigeria, while expressing belief in the good intentions of the "Casablanca" powers, said it was imperative that all African states declare publicly their adherence to the policy of non-intervention in one another's affairs and of scrupulous respect for the right of all African states, large or small, to live at peace with one another. Among the Conference's other decisions were the following: to set up a permanent political Secretariat in an effort to draw in other African states, to establish a number of other specific organizations, e.g. scientific, economic; and to put on record the Conference's views on issues such as being in favor of self-determination for Angola. The Conference directed the foreign ministers of governments attending to meet within three months to study terms of a proposed Organization of African States. The proposal for this organization is to be ratified at a Chiefs of State meeting now scheduled for this spring. Another meeting is expected to be held at Tunis in April to be attended, it is hoped, by representatives of all groupings. The states attending the Lagos meeting have apparently not quite decided whether or not they will attend the meeting at Tunis.

25X1C10b

**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

12 March 1962

495. Lessons From the 5th Moscow WFTU Congress

25X1C10b

Background: The Fifth World Trade Union (WFTU) Congress convened in Moscow December 4-15, 1961, centering on affirming CPSU policy adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and on cooperation with non-Communist trade unions. Secretary General Louis Saillant set the general theme of the meeting in his opening address as the "struggle for peace, co-existence, disarmament, and anti-colonialism." In general, the proceedings followed anticipated lines, with one important exception. The leader of the Italian Delegation and Chairman of WFTU, Augustino Novella (Secretary General of the CGIL in Italy) proposed 28 amendments to the WFTU program, causing a sharp fight in the convention in which the Italian proposals were finally defeated and Novella failed of re-election as Chairman. The Italian position, clearly in opposition to CPSU doctrine, and the program of WFTU as finally adopted, can best be summarized by a quotation from Corriere Della Sera, a Milan paper, published December 3, 1961, on the eve of the Congress:

"This document (an official position paper of the Executive Council of the CGIL) also reflects the peculiar position of the CGIL, within which the communists must perforce take the presence of the socialists into account, not to mention the danger of isolation and pressure from other union groups. But it reflects only fleetingly the conflicts and the contrasting viewpoints within the organization, all of which have been heightened since Khrushchev's latest fulminations. It came out in the Avanti! conflict that the Federation document (The WFTU draft program) was altogether inadequate: it put too much stress on the opposition between the two blocs; it confounded the politico-military blocs with socio-economic systems; it scorned the idea of individual negotiations in the several countries and failed to recognize the independence of the trade unions; and assigned the unions in capitalist countries to a position inferior to those in the socialist countries."

In contrast to this rift, and somewhat to the surprise of most observers, no differences between the Soviets and the Chinese were surfaced at the Congress.

25X1C10b



**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

496. South Vietnam: Communist China Claims Its Security Threatened  
by U.S. Assistance to South Vietnam.

25X1C10b

Background:

1. General: A Communist China Foreign Ministry statement of 24 February 1962 declared that the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam is in effect a new stage in an undeclared war which seriously effects the security of China. The Peking statement, which concluded with a demand for immediate consultations among the countries concerned, followed closely on the heels of an official note from North Vietnam's foreign ministry to the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (USSR and Britain) calling for "urgent measures to halt U.S. armed aggression in South Vietnam." The Soviet Union, which has given little more than perfunctory propaganda support to earlier Hanoi appeals on this issue, warned in Pravda 27 February that U.S. military action against Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam involved a possibility of "alarming consequences" for world peace and declared North Vietnam's appeal for international support against U.S. aggression would be heard.

2. Communist China Attempts to Generate International Fears. Peking's Foreign Ministry statement of 24 February, as broadcast the same date by Radio Peking, is designed to generate international fears that U.S. policy in South Vietnam may broaden the area of conflict. The statement reviews the scope of U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam, and terms the U.S. Military Assistance Command "an operational command of the U.S. imperialists for direct participation in the direction of the Ngo Dinh Diem clique's suppression of the South Vietnamese people's just and patriotic struggle." Pointing to the U.S. statement that its military men will shoot if shot at, Peking observes "this shows in fact that the U.S. is already in an undeclared war in southern Vietnam." The statement concludes with the following allegations with regard to the security of China.

"The U.S. imperialist's armed intervention and aggression in southern Vietnam constitutes a direct threat to the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; it also seriously affects the security of China and the peace of Asia. ... as everyone knows, while the spearhead of the U.S. imperialist aggression is directed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it is directed indirectly at China.

12 March 1962

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2

"The Chinese Government has always stood for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. China took part in the 1954 Geneva agreements and has all along striven to insure the strict implementation of the agreements. U.S. violations of the Geneva Agreements, which have been going on since 1954, have developed to an extremely dangerous stage. This state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. The Chinese Government holds that the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference and the countries concerned must promptly hold consultations and take appropriate measures to eliminate the serious danger of war in southern Vietnam by peaceful means, so that the Geneva agreements and the peace of Indochina can be safeguarded."

25X1C10b




4. U.S. Response to Communist Demand for Immediate Consultations  
On 1 March Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a news conference, (For transcript see New York Times, 2 March, attached) made it clear that (1) U.S. assistance to South Vietnam, which is under attack by guerrillas directed, trained, supplied and reinforced by North Vietnam in gross violation of the 1954 Geneva accord, was in response to the SVN government's request; (2) there are no U.S. combat units in SVN, where the U.S. has no desire for bases or other military advantages; (3) the U.S. is assisting with

training, logistics, transportation and advisory personnel to enable the Government of Vietnam to deal with the Communist effort to take over the country by violent means. Secretary Rusk stated:

"In reference to the demand by the Communists that the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference and other countries concerned consult regarding Vietnam, [See Chicom statement para b above] the United States is always prepared to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is the Communist aggression against Vietnam in disregard of the Geneva accords." [See attachment for report of the Secretary's remarks to the press]

25X1C10b



**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

497. Communist Reaction to Glenn Flight  
25X1C406

**Background:** The non-Communist press throughout the world paid abundant tribute to the courage and skill of Lt. Col. Glenn, and to American space technology. Naturally, most free world commentators also mentioned the orbital flights of Yuri Gagarin and German Titov, but in doing so, they usually noted that the American flight took place openly, before the eyes of the world. Neutralist comment sometimes expressed concern that Soviet-American competition might be intensified, but many others -- including some neutral media, such as the Stockholm Tidningen -- saw in the American success a welcome restoration of the world balance of power in this special field. Throughout the non-Communist world, there was satisfaction over the successful flight and the resulting improvement in American prestige.

The Soviets did not--indeed, could not--repeat the derisory comment they had made on the Shepard and Grissom flights. Titov did not repeat his statement, made at the 22nd CPSU Congress:

"We learned the names of the American cosmonauts and got some information about them. What are the ideals of these people? What brought them to the cabin of the cosmic rocket? The American press reported on them as persons whose actions are motivated by one aim--money. Business, to get their cosmic fee, to buy a house, a shop, to set up their business, to become well-to-do bourgeois exploiters--this is the ideal of American cosmonauts which brought them to the launching pad of the rocket site."

But for the Bloc press (except Tirana and Peiping who largely ignored his feat) the Glenn flight was an occasion for various forms of propaganda gamesmanship, some fairly subtle, others much less so, as follows:

1. Transparent Generosity. There was an effort to present an appearance of objectivity and fairness, as by broadcasting full factual details and a recording of Glenn's voice. There was also TV coverage, though not "live." The Soviets usually refrained from direct, self-attributed comparison between Soviet and U.S. space achievements. And congratulatory messages for Glenn from Gagarin, Titov, President of the Soviet Academy of Science Keldysh, and astronomer Alla Masevich were highly publicized, especially to domestic audiences. Broadcasts to North America quoted a number of generous statements from leading Soviet scientists; these generally placed more emphasis on the advanced state of American technology than was given in broadcasts for domestic audiences. These and other broadcasts to America and Europe also stressed heavily the idea that international cooperation in space was desirable.

~~SECRET~~

(497. Continued)



2. Buried Criticism. Soviet broadcasts, which for weeks had been assiduously reporting the postponements in the flight, now emphasized the difficulties in the automatic orientation system and temperature control, etc. There was, particularly just before the flight, much shedding of crocodile tears over the plight of poor Glenn, with one 17 February broadcast reporting that American scientists were expecting and recommending that Glenn be replaced by someone else, and that Grissom was rumored to have asked to be relieved of his duties under Project Mercury. The Bloc press was filled with suggestions that Glenn's life was being gambled with, for the sake of a political prestige victory. One of the messages from Soviet scientists broadcast to North America (that of Prof. Vladimir Dobronravov), while generally laudatory, contained two subtle jabs: Dobronravov suggested that the lesser weight of Glenn's spaceship was explained by its use of lighter, more durable materials (thus calling attention to the difference between the weights lifted by the USSR and the U.S. rockets), and that it was scientifically important to know that "a man of 40 also felt well in the state of weightlessness," showing that "any person properly trained for space flights can endure this state."

3. Take-off for Self-Praise. Reports on Glenn's flight were often used as pegs for extended discussion of Soviet space achievements and plans. A characteristic Pravda dispatch welcomed the "great and joyous event" and then went on to deprecate it by recalling the many postponements, discoursing at length on the difficulties encountered, and stating that "many" Americans "wondered whether the 10-time postponement had not affected the cosmonaut's moral fiber and well-being." After quoting an official at Cape Canaveral as saying that the flight "could have ended in disaster," Pravda's correspondent devoted the remainder of his article to recalling the feats of "trail blazers" Gagarin and Titov.

4. Silence on Main U.S. Distinction. Moscow made no reference to the open character of the final launching. (On 27 January, however, in reporting one of the postponements, Moscow had--perhaps inadvertently--reported that "hundreds of lenses of motion picture and TV cameras, and representatives of the press, radio, and television of 16 countries were assembled" to witness a launching which did not take place. If this was not inadvertence, the aim was probably to show the U.S. as suffering a prestige defeat in front of the whole world.)

5. Grabbing the Spotlight. Khrushchev, as an American TV commentator put it, "got into the act" by expressing hopes, in his congratulatory message, for joint efforts in mastering space. Tass failed to report the portion of President Kennedy's reply which pointed out that Kennedy had made precise proposals early in 1961. Khrushchev had previously replied to American suggestions of cooperation by saying that disarmament would

12 March 1962

have to come first; this condition was now omitted, although the most widely broadcast Moscow Radio comment on the Glenn flight tried to link Khrushchev's proposal with the claim that the USSR stands for disarmament.

6. Indirect Self-Praise. Foreign press comment was frequently quoted out of context to show that the world still regards the U.S. as being behind the USSR in space.

President Kennedy has now forwarded to Khrushchev (7 March) specific concrete suggestions for cooperation in operating a weather satellite system, reciprocal tracking services, satellites for mapping the earth's magnetic field, and intercontinental communication satellites, as well as for pooling efforts and knowledge in the field of space medicine. Aside from these possible areas of joint activity (in some of which Soviet achievements so far have been negligible), President Kennedy invited other proposals from the USSR, and suggested that other nations too could contribute. (Information in this paragraph not yet - 12 March - released for publication.)

25X1C10b

\* See next page for unclassified figures from NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) giving the scores of the U.S. and the USSR on their space vehicle programs.

Space Vehicles Launched as of March 5, 1962

<u>Number</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Total launched	65	13 (one of which passed around the moon)
Currently in orbit	36	3
Earth orbit	33	1
Solar orbit	3	2
Transmitting	10	0
Lunar impact	0	1

498. CPSU STATISTICS: Significant Data on Membership and Party Structure  
~~23X1C105~~

**Background:** Partiinaya Zhizn, ("Party Life"), a publication of the Central Committee of the CPSU, carried in its January 1962 issue #1 an article "The Party in Figures" (for complete translation, see PRESS COMMENT, 6 March 1962, p. 15). This article contains numerous statistics about party membership and structure, enabling us to draw certain significant conclusions -- despite the fact that the statistics are obviously incomplete (they omit the number of party members or basic party units in the Armed Services, they do not specify how many members the party lost by death or resignation, they do not break down membership by age, etc.) and that the meaning of the figures is often inadequately or ambiguously defined. Does "membership," for instance, denote all persons admitted once to the party and not yet struck from its rolls, or only persons paying their dues, or actively participating in the work of their basic party units?

**Over-all Figures.** Partiinaya Zhizn (PZ) states that total CPSU membership -- "full" members and candidates -- rose from 7.2 million on 1 January 1956 to 9.7 million on 1 October 1961, i.e., an increase of 2.5 million (2.1 million full members and 400 thousand candidate members) (or 34.7%) in less than 6 years (the article gives detailed figures down to the last digit, but we use only round figures here). It specifies that 3 million persons were accepted as candidates and 2.5 million as members, totalling at least 3.4 million -- i.e., all candidates accepted since 1956, plus the 400,000 candidates who were on the party rolls on 1 January 1956 and who must be presumed to have become "full" members since. This figure is higher by 900,000 than the reported total increase of 2.5 million members (both "full" and candidate members). Later, PZ reports that "more than 200,000 persons have been expelled from the party for various reasons," a figure identified as being merely two fifths of those who were expelled from or "dropped out of" the party in the five years (1950-1955) preceding the 20th CPSU Congress. A subsequent tabulation in the article refers to those "expelled or automatically dropped from the party," again adding up to somewhat over 200,000. This leaves at least 700,000 persons unaccounted for -- who may have either died or left the party on their own initiative.

**Nationalities.** PZ states that 6.1 million among the total of 9.6 million members and candidates as of 1 July, 1961 -- that is 63.6% or almost two thirds -- were Russians by nationality: according to the 15 January, 1959, census, 114.1 out of a total population of 208 million -- that is, 54.8% were ethnic Russians. This prevalence of Russians in party membership is even more pronounced in several of the smaller constituent republics. In the Kazakh SSR, for instance, there are 366,000 party members, but only 149,000 are Kazakhs by nationality: in other words, even if we assume that all CPSU members of Kazakh nationality live in the Kazakh SSR, they are only a minority in the ruling party organization of their "own" territory.

Or, in the Latvian SSR, 76,000 party members are reported, but only 33,900 of Latvian nationality (the latter figure represents 0.35% of the total party membership, while Latvians, according to the 1959 census, are 0.6% of the population of the USSR).

Length of Party Membership. 3.4 million persons were admitted to the party since 1 January 1956 so that 35% of the total have joined in these last 6 years. PZ notes merely that 2.4 million (24.3%) of the total on 1 October 1961 were members of less than 3 years' standing or still candidates. In another context, however, the article notes that in 1961 40% of the members had 10 years of membership or less, 52% had 11 - 25 years and 8% had over 25 years.

Social Composition. PZ stresses proudly the increase in manual workers, farm hands and technical specialists among party members, contrasted against a reduction in bureaucrats and other "non-proletarian" elements. This effort is understandable since every Communist Party is supposed to represent the "workers and peasants," and, when in power, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" -- but the statistics offered in support of this claim are even more questionable than others. The article itself admits that "social status is determined by the chief occupation at the time of entry into the party." Since that day -- which in the case of more than half of all party members lies more than 10 years back --, many of the one-time "workers and peasants" have undoubtedly been promoted to full-time paid positions in the party and its mass organizations, in the government, the armed services, etc. and have long shed their "proletarian" past. Moreover, PZ defines categories in exceedingly vague terms: one of the tabulations, for instance, classes all members who are not workers or peasants as "employees and all others" (48% of the total membership in 1961) and breaks this further down into such "catch-all" sub-divisions as "heads of organizations, institutions, enterprises, construction projects, state farms and Repair and Technical Stations and their sub-divisions" (10.2% of all "employees" in 1961). The figures of agricultural "workers" recruited show a much more rapid increase in trained specialists (800%) as compared with field, truck and orchard workers (60%). PZ hides members in the Armed Forces -- and possibly other categories -- by various tricks: for instance, by limiting, at one place, percentage figures to "Communists in territorial Party organizations," without giving any absolute figures. Despite all these misleading maneuvers, the article finally admits that no less than 10.8% of all members (almost one million) are employed (more correctly: were already employed on the day they joined the party) in the "Apparatus of state and economic agencies and Party and public organizations." "Public organizations," in this context, denotes Communist fronts. Needless to say, hundreds of thousands of additional party members, though on the payroll of industrial enterprises, state or collective farms or engaged in other "productive" work, are primarily working in the interest, and under the orders, of the party.

Educational Level. 1.3 million members, or 13.3% of the total as of 1 July, 1961, are reported to have higher (college or university) education -- against 11.2% 5 years earlier. 2.8 million or 29.6% of all members (1956: 25.8%) had "incomplete higher and secondary education." Of the latter, 1.8 million or 18.6% (1956: 16.8%) had

"specialized" (presumably: technical, industrial or agricultural) education. Another 2.7 million, that is, 28.6% (1956: 29.6%) had "partial secondary" education.

Age and Sex Distribution. PZ does not offer age statistics, but notes that in 1952 45% of the members "had been raised under Soviet rule" (which presumably means: born since 1917 -- that is, they were, in 1952, 35 years old or less). In 1956, this figure had increased to 53% and in 1961, before the 22nd CPSU Congress, to 67% (i.e., presumably 44 years old or less). The party's strong accent on youth is also shown by the fact that 1.6 million who were admitted as candidate members between 1956 and 1961 (52% of the total) had been members of the Young Communist League (KOMSOMOL). No other data about front organizations or about the channels through which the other 48% of new candidates came to the party are given. 1.9 million party members in 1961 (19.8% of the total) were women, as against 1.4 million (19.7%) in 1956.

Party Apparat. As usual in Communist Party reports, the article does not reveal the number of paid party officials: in the occupational figures, quoted above, the number of party employees is hidden among figures of government and front organizations' employees. Nevertheless, PZ's data indicate the vast scope and the huge manpower resources of the CPSU's apparat: it states that "more than 1,800,000 Communists have been elected to party committees and the bureaus of primary party organizations and as secretaries, assistant secretaries and party group organizers." It also relates that the party had, as of 1 October 1961,

- 157 Province, territory and Union-Republic Central Committees
- 10 National region committees
- 602 City committees
- 343 Borough committees
- 3,202 District committees.

In 1961, more than 306,000 members were elected to these committees. This "superstructure" supervises no less than 296,444 primary party organizations, including

- 75,681 at Industrial, transportation etc. enterprises
- 41,387 at Collective farms
- 9,206 at State farms
- 52,501 at "Institutions, organizations and economic agencies"
- 56,968 at Educational, scientific, cultural and medical institutions
- 12,594 at Trade and public catering enterprises.

(Note that the above breakdown adds up only to 248,337, leaving more than 48,000 of the total 296,444 primary organizations unaccounted for -- to be found presumably in the Armed Forces.) In some categories, the number of party units has been reduced -- for instance, at collective farms because of the continuing merger of farms --, but this undoubtedly indicates a streamlining rather than a curtailing of the party machine.

What is not specified in the official figures is the increased importance of the apparatchiks in the Party. Previously, a good proportion of top echelon members in the Party had fairly wide experience in government,



economics, and other professional fields -- e.g. the expelled anti-Party group. It now appears, from the occupational histories of a cross section of Party members, that more and more professional party men (i.e. those who have spent their lives running the Party organization itself) are assuming importance in the Party. All of the new presidium and secretariat members - G.I. Voronov, V.V. Shcherbitsky, S.R. Rashidov, P.N. Demichov, L.F. Ilichev, B.N. Ponomarev, A.N. Shelepin, and I.V. Spiridonov - are all party professionals.

25X1C10b

**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050014-2**